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appeal if the legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available at
the time. However, the Supreme Court decided that since Adams had
not objected on the state law grounds available to him at trial under
the ruling in Tedder v. Florida, and where the state law objection was
a "necessary ingredient" of the subsequently available Caldwell
claim, the latter is now barred. 109 S. Ct. at 1217. The Adams Court
made it explicit that the holding did not imply that "...whenever a
defendant has any basis for challenging particular conduct as
improper, a failure to preserve that claim under state procedural law
bars any subsequently available claim arising out of the same
conduct." Id. at 1217. Still, the holding leaves open that possibility in
a given case where the basis for state and federal claims are closely
related.
ANALYSIS
This case illustrates once again that Virginia attorneys must read
all applicable state and federal law, make all appropriate objections
on all available state and federal grounds, and preserve them on direct
appeal. This is because of the difficulty imposed by habeas law. It is
important to note that, on certiorari, the State addressed only the
claim of procedural bar. Adamns, n.4 at 1215. The Court did not reach
the merits of Adams' Caldwell claim, id., but instead saw the issue as
one of exercising the Court's "equitable power to overlook respon-
dent's state procedural default." 109 S. Ct. at 1216 - 1217.
To address this "threshold" issue, the Court reviewed the
requirements set out in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct.
2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1977). Under Sykes, habeas petitioners must
show cause for the default and prejudice, i.e., a real possibility of a
different result, before federal courts will review claims found to be
procedurally defaulted by state courts.
The Caldwell holding in itself is worth noting by Virginia attor-
neys. Although the trial court is not likely to mislead the jury about
its role and responsibility, the Commonwealth's attorney in his
closing argument might do so. At that point it is the responsibility of
the defense to interrupt and object on Caldwell grounds.
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FACTS
Petitioner Hildwin was convicted of first degree murder. The
jury returned a unanimous advisory verdict of death and the judge
imposed the death sentence. The trial judge, in imposing sentence,
found four aggravating circumstances which were set forth in writing
as required under Florida law. The jury made no specific finding as
to aggravating circumstances. Florida law requires that at least one
aggravating circumstance must be found before the death sentence
may be imposed. Petitioner argued before the Florida Supreme Court
"that the Florida capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth
Amendment because it permits the imposition of death without a
specific finding by the jury that sufficient aggravating circumstances
exist to qualify the defendant for capital punishment." Hildwin, 109
S. Ct. at 2056. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument
without discussion and Hildwin petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court.
HOLDING
The Sixth Amendment does not require that specific findings
authorizing the death sentence be made by a jury. Petitioner argued
before the Florida Supreme Court that the Sixth Amendment requires
a specific finding, by the jury, of aggravating factors support a
sentence of death. The Florida Supreme Court found this argument
meritless. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that in Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1984), it
had rejected any Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury trial on
sentencing issues. The Court also referred to McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1986), which
held that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing even
where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." Hildwin, 109
S. Ct. at 2057. "The existence of an aggravating factor ... is not an
element of the offense but ... is 'a sentencing factor that comes into
play only after the defendant has been found guilty."' Id.
ANALYSIS
Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(D), requires that a jury returning a
death sentence do so on a form specifying what aggravating factors
have been found. In Virginia, unlike Florida, the jury's determina-
tion is not advisory; a life sentence is binding upon the judge, and a
death sentence may be set aside only for good cause. Virginia's
statute, therefore, exceeds the Sixth Amendment requirements of
McMillan and Spaziano as cited in Hildwin. However, the Virginia
Supreme Court has held that a jury need not specify which aggravat-
ing factor it used where both factors could have been found. See
Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979); Hoke
v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d 595 (1989). A unani-
mous death verdict is all the Virginia Supreme Court has required,
despite the statutory requirement of unanimity as to aggravating
factors. Hildwin, therefore, does not foreclose a Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process challenge to the Virginia Supreme Court's
interpretation. In Clark and Hoke, the Supreme Court of Virginia
acknowledged a distinction between factors required to prove the
elements of an offense and factors affecting sentencing; objections to
the lack of specificity in the jury's findings were based on statutory
interpretation rather than the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court of Virginia noted that other courts construing similar
statutes treated the aggravating factors as a single unit. Clark at 213.
Hoke argued on appeal that no distinction was made between the
"future danger" and "vileness" predicates. The Virginia Supreme
Court found that the facts in the case were sufficient to support either
finding, id. at 316 - 317, and that since the jurors were unanimous in
their verdict of death for all three underlying felonies, Hoke's
argument was meritless.
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